

ESS Visegrad Network+ Conference

13 - 14 October 2022, **Academic Conference Centre**, Husova 4a (**entrance from Jilská 1**), 110 00 Praha 1

Programme

Thursday, 13 October

13:30 Registration

14:00 Democracy, Trust, and Value Orientations

Shivam Sen, Charles University, Prague

Exploring the Link Between Ideological Orientation and Notion of Democracy

Abstract: People's understanding of the term 'democracy' has only recently seen necessary rigorous scholarship with the help of national and cross national surveys such as the European Social Survey. Three basic visions of this construct has been identified; liberal democracy, social democracy and direct democracy. It is understood that different people tend to conceptualize the term using a mix of these three frames. With liberal democracy being the basic model and more demanding individuals conceiving more complex visions of the object. Further, in today's polarized climate it becomes critical to understand the current relationship between an individual's model of democracy and their ideological orientation across left to right. Thus, this paper makes use of the latest data from the European Social Survey of ten European countries to explore how the conceptions of democracy currently differs across individuals with respect to their position on the left-right political spectrum. Results back up earlier findings suggesting: (a) moderate positions are less demanding of democracy than extreme positions and (b) the social justice aspect of democracy is the main line of contention between moderate left and right positions, while extreme ends of both tend to demand a social democracy. Findings also suggest the presence of a 'populist idea of democracy' on both extremes of the political spectrum and in general, a more demanding left side.

Francesca Pignoloni, University College Dublin

Educational Social Mobility and Trust in Institutions in Europe

Abstract: The question of 'generalized distrust' is particularly fitting with the period we are experiencing because it is reflected in the phenomenon of 'no vax'. This is a symptom of a problem that it can be called 'lack of trust in institutions' and which entails a substantial malfunction of the state organism. The presented work aims to show the connection between the lack of educational mobility and the distrust of institutions, European as well as national. In fact, institutions are functional to support individuals in their life path, that might mean that when people find themselves stuck in a certain social dimension due to a lack of opportunities, they are led to blame their country. This core question undergirds two specific questions that more thoroughly detail the research goals, (1) what is the level of educational social mobility within the countries of the European Union. The stress is specifically on educational mobility because university represents the main tool through to access white-collar jobs and higher social positions than those of the working class. Through the European Social Surveys it is possible to know the educational level of the interviewees and that of their parents, therefore they allow a clear understanding of where there has been mobility (downward or upward) and where people have remained stable at the same educational level of their parents. (2) Once this is illustrated, what need to be investigate is the effective link between trust in institutions and the conditions of mobility in the various countries. The Round 9 of the ESS, which focuses mainly on fairness and justice, includes in its variables the trust level in seven institutions (levels: 1-11), allowing to verify the extent of attachment in people who have remained stable or experimented downward or upward mobility. Through the regression model, it is achievable to understand the existence and entity of this link between the level of trust nurtured in institutions and mobility.

Klára Plecitá, Institute of Sociology CAS, Prague

Group Discrimination and Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works in Europe

Abstract: This study explores the link between membership of a discriminated group and satisfaction with the way democracy works (SWD) in Western and Central European countries. It uses an integrated ESS Rounds 5–9 (2010–2018) data set from 18 countries of Western and Central Europe for the analysis. The analysis shows that the prevalence of individuals belonging to groups discriminated against varies across Western and Central Europe, with highest prevalence in the Western and lowest in Central Europe. Members of discriminated groups express dissatisfaction with the way democracy works more than non-discriminated majorities. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works tends to be strongest among discriminated groups in Central Europe. Significant interaction effects between the Western–Central European division and discrimination were found for nationality, ethnicity, language, age, and disability. Estimated marginal means revealed that the effect of discrimination on grounds of nationality, ethnicity, and language on SWD is more dramatic in Central Europe while the effect of discrimination on grounds of age, sexuality, and disability on SWD is stronger in Western Europe. The analysis also showed that discrimination on other grounds explains quality of democracy judgements much better than discrimination on each specific ascriptive ground in both parts of Europe.

Vladimir Mentus, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade

Trends of Value Priorities Across Western Europe – A Latent Growth Curve Modeling Approach

Abstract: In this paper, we examine trends of value priorities on a country level across Western Europe using the Schwartz typology of personal values. Specifically, we consider the following research questions: what are the general trends of ten-value priorities and are there any differences between countries in time effects on these priorities. A comprehensive study of trends on nationally representative samples of entire populations is non-existent. Previous studies have been largely based on certain segments of the population only. Also, the time series so far were mainly shorter or contained a few time waves. As some prior research indicate, change of values is a very slow process even in the face of major institutional transformations. Contrary, as evidenced, e.g. in cases of post-socialist societies, prevailing values may change even within a generation as people acclimate to changing life conditions. The global financial crisis caused the economic downturn, increasing unemployment, and the sovereign debt in most European societies, which might have led to drastic value changes. To examine the intensity and direction of these changes in Western Europe, we use latent growth curve modeling and data from the European Social Survey, including 13 countries (with more than 225,000 respondents) and nine time-points between 2002 and 2018. Results indicate insignificant time effects on security and stimulation, very weak positive time effects on tradition, benevolence, universalism, self-direction, and hedonism, and very weak negative effects on achievement, power, and conformity. Although weak, benevolence and universalism have the strongest positive trends. Finally, results show small country-level differences in trends and the absence of clear patterns of these differences. Generally, our evidence indicates relative stability of values and a very slow cultural shift in Western Europe from personal-focused self-protection toward social-focused self-expansion value priorities.

15:40 Coffee Break

16:00 Jobs, Unemployment, and Income Inequalities

Jovana Zafirovic, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade

'Rightly' Insecure? Job Insecurity and Party Preference in Europe

Abstract: In modern capitalist societies, one dimension of paid work has become especially important - job insecurity and its unequal distribution is a new source of social inequalities (Balz, 2020). The crisis of capitalism has brought multidimensional consequences that are gaining global proportions, all contributing to the growing culture of fear (Castels et al., 2012). In addition, transformations in the sphere of work do not affect all workers equally - thus further polarizing the labor market (OECD, 2019). Consequently, economic concerns affect people's political preferences (Marx, 2014; Wroe, 2014). Thus, we are interested in whether job insecurity draws people to parties on the extremes of the political spectrum. There is limited evidence in the literature of potential political consequences of individuals' perceived job insecurities, especially of longitudinal nature. Additionally, literature mostly focuses on objective variables. Our study relies on relative deprivation theory which suggests that perception of job insecurity can trigger feelings of deprivation resulting in a higher risk of developing anti-foreign sentiments and affinities to extremist right-wing parties (Geishecker & Siedler, 2012). We examine whether job insecurity impacts individuals' party identification by using indicators of both objective and subjective insecurity. Thus, we conduct multilevel models on European Social Survey data from 2004 and 2010 thereby providing a direct comparison between the period before the crisis and a period in which most countries have emerged from the recession. Consistent with the deprivation theory, we find strong evidence that subjective job insecurity fosters more affinity for far right-wing parties compared to objective insecurity and that this effect is stronger after the crisis.

Ivan Petrúšek, Institute of Sociology CAS, Prague

The Lasting Effect of Long-term Unemployment on Redistribution Support in Europe

Abstract: This work in progress analyses the impact of unemployment on attitudes towards income redistribution in more than twenty-five European countries. At the individual level, the analysis assesses whether being currently unemployed or having experienced a longer spell of unemployment (longer than three months) has a stronger effect on support for income redistribution. In line with material self-interest theories, previous research based on cross-sectional data suggests that unemployment status is associated with higher redistribution support, while panel data analyses demonstrate that job loss is associated with an increase in redistribution support. Nevertheless, previous research on the effect of personal experience with long-term unemployment is much less common, while studies on their simultaneous effects are scarce. Three-level hierarchical models estimated on the first nine rounds of the European Social Survey suggest that past personal experience with a longer unemployment spell has a much stronger effect on pro-redistributive attitudes than being currently unemployed. The longer the experience with unemployment, the stronger the redistribution support. Furthermore, the effect of experience with long-term unemployment lasts beyond re-employment. At the contextual level, the effect of experience with long-term unemployment on redistribution support is moderated by country-level structural unemployment, as higher structural unemployment decreases the size of the analysed effect. It seems that living in contexts with higher structural unemployment lowers the social stigmatisation of the long-term unemployed. Moreover, countries with high structural unemployment are, on average, more pro-redistributive, thus creating ceiling effects for some individual-level predictors.

Michał Litwiński, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

Environmental Concerns and Acceptance for Income Inequalities

Abstract: Motivation: Income inequality is believed to be one of the factors influencing attitudes toward environmental issues. However, while there are many studies of the impact of income inequality on attitudes toward environmental issues, the list of analyses on the consequences of acceptance for income differences on environmental concerns is quite short. In addition, studies of the impact of the absolute level of income inequality on environmental issues yield non-conclusive results. Perhaps it is the acceptance of income inequality rather than its absolute level that drives perceptions of environmental issues.

Purpose: The purpose of the study, therefore, is to identify the nature of the impact of income inequality acceptance on environmental concerns. Contribution: The study fills a gap in research on the impact of income dispersion on environmental issues by recognizing the importance of acceptance for the former. Importantly, the study determines whether the consideration of the absolute level of income dispersion instead of the attitude in previous studies is the cause of the ambiguous results. In addition, the results of the study may be useful for environmental policymakers who can adjust regulations to account for the level of acceptance for income inequality. Data and methods: The study is based on data from all ESS rounds (2002-2020) for the Visegrad Group countries. Multilevel logistic regression allows us to formulate conclusions about the relationship of interest. Factors mediating the latter, specifically personal income, GDP per capita, redistribution rate and political views, are included.

Preliminary results: Acceptance for income inequality influences environmental concerns. The lower the acceptance, the higher the likelihood of caring for the environment. This may be because the tendency to insist on reducing income inequality is often related to leftist political views. This orientation, in turn, is associated with greater concern for the environment.

Friday, 14 October

9:00 Registration

9:30 Family and Parenting

Mare Ainsaar, University of Tartu

Values and Resources of Large Families in Central Europe compared to other countries in Europe

<u>Abstract:</u> The share of large families is declining in Europe and the studies of large families have been abandoned due to lack of demographic interest, but partially also because of limited access of reliable data. Especially international comparisons of large families are rare because of limited data. In this paper we use international European Social survey pooled data for analyses of resources and values of large families. We are especially interested in particularities of Central European countries with low fertility rates – Hungary, Poland, Slovakia.

Jana Klímová Chaloupková, Kristýna Pospíšilová, Institute of Sociology CAS, Prague

Intensive parenting norms: exploring measurement invariance across three European countries and social-demographic groups

Abstract: The social norms of intensive child-centred parenting have become increasingly dominant in recent decades. However, despite interest in the social variations of these norms, studies that discuss whether these norms convey the same meanings across different country contexts and social groups are rare. Drawing upon data from the European Social Survey Cross-national Online Survey Panel (CRONOS) (2017) administered in Estonia, Slovenia and Great Britain, this study examines two questions: 1) whether the intensive parenting norms scale used in CRONOS is comparable across these three countries, and if not, how such comparability might be established, and 2) whether the scale is equivalent across major socio-demographic characteristics identified as factors that affect differences in parenting norms – namely, gender, education, parental status and child's age. We apply a traditional approach to test scale measurement invariance using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis. The findings show that metric and configural measurement invariance across the examined social groups was established only for the reduced scale that includes the child-centred and stimulation dimensions, but not for the whole original scale. However, scalar invariance was not found in comparisons among countries and genders, suggesting systematic differences in response styles. We conclude with implications and recommendations for future measurement development and research

James R. Hepburn, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The Effect of Fidesz Family Policies and Socioeconomic Factors on Fertility in Hungary

Abstract: Have Fidesz family policies had a positive effect on fertility in Hungary since 2010? What fertility intentions of individuals do the policies require as a pathway to increase fertility? To answer this question, we estimate difference in differences Probit and Poisson models on European Social Survey data of households and women in all Visegrád countries and six other Central and Eastern European countries from 2002-18. We find that the early phase of Fidesz family policy, focused on financial relief, modestly increased fertility soon after implementation; but that later phases, focused on balancing women's work and home life, did not notably affect fertility. We also find that being Roman Catholic, finding tradition important in life, and not strongly valuing fun and pleasure increase the likelihood of having children. We add to the literature by testing the effect of these novel cultural behavioral and attitudinal variables on fertility outcomes in Central Europe, and by adapting ESS data to study fertility. Second, our study introduces an innovative partial theory of desire that precisely describes how individuals make conditional choices for children, which they realize once their policy, economic or social conditions are met. Our study provides a comprehensive and detailed exposition of family policy in Hungary from 1990 to the present, followed by an exhaustive division of desires into those that are simple or conditional, and then ideal, reluctant, indifferent or irrational, used in the empirical study. Fidesz family policies intend to increase fertility by meeting economic conditions many people have for childbearing. However, our empirical study suggests, alongside the literature, that deeper cultural practices and attitudes both add to these economic conditions, and determine how restrictive they are. The policies have seen at most modest success likely because they did or could not address or change these cultural preconditions for having children.

11:10 Social Contact and Exclusion

Denisa Fedáková, Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences, Bratislava

Job Satisfaction and (Digital) Social Contacts at Work in ESS Round 10 Data

Abstract: Job satisfaction comprises feelings, emotions a needs' fulfilment at work. The need of flexibility is linked to work-life balance. The need of socialization is linked to social contacts. Digitalization at work creates new forms of both job flexibility and socialization. The ESS Round 10 rotating module data on Digital social contacts at work and ESS Round 5 data on job satisfaction were analysed. The aim of the presentation is to explore the level of job satisfaction in 10 participating countries and to learn more about the relationship between job satisfaction, work-life balance and digital social contacts at work. Results indicate an overall increase in job satisfaction across all ten countries comparing Round 10 and Round 5 data. The highest percentage of respondents extremely dissatisfied with their job comes from Bulgaria (1.7%). The highest percentage of extremely satisfied (with job) respondents comes from Slovakia (24.4%). The Job satisfaction significantly correlated with perceived support from the line manager and work-life balance items across all participating countries. Various forms of social contact at work also significantly correlated with job satisfaction. 20-57% of respondents reported that they met and spoke in person to line managers at work daily. 56-80% of respondents reported that they met and spoke in person to colleagues at work daily. Other forms of social contact with line manager or colleagues on daily bases were either phone call or sending a text and their frequencies differed across participating countries. Communication via screen on daily bases was reported as the least used form of social contacts at work. Findings indicate the complexity of job satisfaction and its correlates. Further investigation of relationships between job satisfaction and social contact at work is desirable.

Sunwoo Lee, Palacky University Olomouc

Perceived Social Exclusion and Ageism and its Pathway to Mental Health in European Older Adults

Abstract: Background: Older adults who frequently experience social exclusion and discrimination are at greater risk for decline in mental health and psychological well-being. The current study examined age-specific prevalence and patterns of social exclusion and discrimination, and how they are related to mental health disparities in older European adults.

Methods: Using multiple waves of the European Social Survey (ESS), regression analysis was conducted. Key variables included perception of agerelated discrimination, social exclusion (material resources, civic participation, social relations, basic services, neighborhood cohesion), depression, and subjective well-being. Covariates included socio-demographic information.

Results: Perceived age discrimination was pronounced among adults aged 65+ compared to their younger counterparts. Older adults who were female, widowed, and with relatively lower levels of education showed a higher likelihood for perceived age discrimination. Levels of social exclusion were reported higher among those who indicated perceived age discrimination. In both older and younger adults, age discrimination was significantly associated with depression score when controlled for socio-demographic variables. Social exclusion and age discrimination were differently associated with well-being index across older and younger groups.

Conclusions: Societal and cultural contexts (politics, social and health care regimes, neighborhood environment) greatly inform age stereotype and discrimination which exacerbate social exclusion and internalized stigma in older adults. To promote older adults' sense of well-being, multilayered intervention should be incorporated, ranging from micro-level psychological intervention to macro-level improvements of structural and cultural resources.